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The State Secrets Privilege and the Abdication of 
Oversight 
 
“In proportion as the nation’s statecraft is increasingly devoted to the 
gainful pursuit of international intrigue, . . . it will necessarily take on a 
more furtive character, and will conduct a larger proportion of its 
ordinary work by night and cloud.” . . . The people . . . would tend to 
accept this in a complaisant, even grateful, spirit on the growing 
conviction that night and cloud best provided for national security.1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 17, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
National Security Agency (NSA), alleging constitutional violations 
resulting from a secret domestic surveillance program.2 The New York 
Times published leaked information about this secret program the 
previous December,3 raising civil libertarians’ concerns about 
unsupervised surveillance of Americans.4 This suit recalls a series of 
actions brought 28 years earlier by Vietnam War protesters who also had 
been the subjects of NSA surveillance,5 and raises the same issues of 
secrecy, national security, and the constitutional rights of individuals. 
The federal judiciary has been presented with the opportunity to revisit 
and reconsider the state secrets privilege by this and other cases in which 
the government has recently claimed the privilege.6
 1. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 337 (First Mariner Books 
2004) (1973) (quoting THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 444 (1954)). 
 2. Complaint at 2, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 2:06-cv-10204), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/ 
asset_upload_file137_23491.pdf; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Sues to 
Stop Illegal Spying on Americans, Saying President Is Not Above the Law (Jan. 17, 2006), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/23486prs20060117.html. 
 3. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Let U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 4. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Demands Records 
About Warrantless Spying by National Security Agency (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/23150prs20051220.html. 
 5. See Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978); and Halkin v. Helms 
(Halkin II), 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 6. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ore. 2006) (suit 
by alleged subject of communications interceptions against President Bush for, inter alia, violation 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in monitoring telephone conversations through the 
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The state secrets privilege is a common law doctrine of evidence that 
allows a court to refuse to admit evidence in civil trials when the 
executive claims that disclosure would jeopardize national security.7 It 
was first crystallized during the Cold War and has since been invoked 
many times to obstruct discovery requests in a wide variety of tort 
actions against the government and between parties privy to sensitive 
government information.8
The Cold War indelibly altered the executive branch’s attitude 
toward information to a stricter and more pervasive use of secrecy, and 
away from the candor and disclosure that characterized the government’s 
use of information before World War II.9 The abuses of executive 
secrecy in the late 1960s and early 1970s that surrounded Vietnam policy 
and the Watergate scandal created a public furor, but ultimately did not 
change judicial doctrine concerning the state secrets privilege. 
Surprisingly, in the years that followed the Watergate scandal and other 
revelations of the abuse of secrecy, the judiciary interpreted its executive 
secrecy doctrine in a way that strengthened and expanded the ability of 
the government to deny information to litigants.10 The state secrets 
privilege has become so ingrained in the public consciousness and 
government practice that to question its legitimacy may seem 
secret NSA program); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (suit by AT&T 
customers for violation of privacy rights pursuant to AT&T’s participation in the secret NSA 
program); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (suit similar in its facts to 
Terkel); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (suit by a German citizen against 
former CIA director George Tenet for, inter alia, alleged kidnapping, illegal detention, abusive 
interrogation, and “extraordinary rendition” to Afgahnistan, resulting in extended imprisonment and 
torture); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (suit by an individual of dual 
Syrian/Canadian citizenship for alleged wrongful detention and “extraordinary rendition” to Syria, 
also resulting in extended imprisonment and torture); Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 
65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005) 
(suit by former FBI employee for alleged wrongful termination after “blowing the whistle” on FBI 
failures related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). 
 7. See generally James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966); 
MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SECURITY: SECRECY AND 
SURVEILLANCE 98–115 (1977); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 332–40 (Carolina Academic Press 2005); Note, The Military and 
State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 
YALE L.J. 570 (1982) [hereinafter Military & State Secrets Privilege]. 
 8. See J. Steven Gardner, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A Proposal 
for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 584 n.170–71 (1994) (indicating that the 
privilege was used in only five cases between 1951 and 1970, and had been used over 50 times 
between 1970 and 1994, the year of the article’s publication). 
 9. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 331–36 (concluding that before World War II 
the national government used secrecy only sporadically and in an extremely limited fashion); see 
also id. at 43–46 (showing that the general rule in the early republic, accepted by presidents of the 
founding generation, of all political persuasions, was that Congress and the public were entitled to 
all information requested from the executive with few and extremely narrow exceptions). 
 10. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 977; Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 1. 
  
231] THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 237 
 
anachronistic, especially, as now, in a time of perceived threat. 
On the other hand, though the use of the state secrets privilege is not 
controversial, it should be considered as controversial for the purpose of 
reassessing its compatibility with constitutional principles.11 Just as the 
constitutional role of the judiciary has become a lightening rod for public 
debate, so too should the executive’s assertions of its secrecy 
prerogative. This is especially true in the War Against Terrorism. The 
confluence of a grave threat from international terrorism, public anger 
and fear resulting from high-profile terrorist attacks, and an ambitious 
presidency intent upon expanding executive power12 have created strong 
incentives for the president to push for more latitude to operate in 
secrecy, and for Congress and the public to acquiesce to executive 
demands. 
Thus the War Against Terrorism again presents the American 
republic with questions about the propriety of executive secrecy. In 
response to the terrorist threat, the Bush administration has taken 
extraordinary actions using secrecy as one of its main tools. It used 
misinformation based on classified intelligence to promote the Iraq War. 
It classifies American citizens as “enemy combatants” using undisclosed 
facts and then detains them indefinitely, denying their Sixth Amendment 
rights.13 It ordered the secret and probably illegal surveillance of 
American citizens by the NSA.14 And it secretly captures, imprisons, 
interrogates, and “renders” people to states known to torture.15 Such 
 11. For examples of current academic reassessment, see Anthony Rapa, Comment, When 
Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets 
Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 233 (2006), and Erin M. Stilp, Commnet, The Military and State 
Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 831 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen 
Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A01 (identifying the warrantless counterterrorist 
wiretapping program secretly conducted by the NSA since September 2001 as merely a “slice of a 
broader struggle over the power of the presidency” directed, in large part, by Vice President 
Cheney). 
 13. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on 
other grounds, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 14. Compare Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 
19, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html 
[hereinafter White House Press Briefing] (defending the NSA program), with Memorandum from the 
Congressional Research Service on Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic 
Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report] (concluding that the 
executive’s legal justification of the NSA program was not “well-grounded” and a court probably 
would not hold it to be valid). See also Carol D. Leonnig, Report Rebuts Bush on Spying: Domestic 
Action’s Legality Challenged, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at A01; Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA 
Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nybooks 
.com/articles/18650. 
15.Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 
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actions (and others we may not know about) make imperative a revived 
debate over the wisdom and desirability of the “expansive and 
malleable”16 state secrets privilege. As currently applied, it is a 
formidable obstacle to civil litigation against the government, an 
evisceration of the ability of a citizen injured by such executive acts to 
seek redress, oversee government actions, and hold officials accountable 
for bad policy or violations of the law. 
This paper will first chart the development of the state secrets 
privilege as it is currently applied, identifying some of its common law 
foundations, its principle articulation in United States v. Reynolds,17 and 
its subsequent expansion in Halkin v. Helms [Halkin I]18 and Halkin v. 
Helms [Halkin II].19 It will then analyze some of the issues created by 
modern application of the privilege, detecting problems it poses both to 
separation of powers doctrine and to effective oversight of the executive 
branch. 
 
II.  HISTORY OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
 
A.  Foundations 
 
In his dissent from the ruling in Halkin I, Judge Bazelon noted that 
the state secrets privilege is “weakly rooted in our jurisprudence.”20 This 
is because before United States v. Reynolds in 1953 there was no 
pronouncement of such a privilege in any statute or case. It is also 
because Reynolds drew principally upon a contemporary English case in 
the formulation of its rule.21 Important principles regarding government 
secrecy were, however, developed in early American case law and 
presumably it was these principles that induced the Reynolds Court to 
assert that “principles which control the application of the privilege 
emerge quite clearly from the available precedents.”22
The earliest American case cited by the Supreme Court in Reynolds 
to support the state secrets privilege is United States v. Burr, from 
2d 530, 532–34 (E.D. Va. 2006). See also Morning Edition: U.S. Acknowledges Existence of Secret 
CIA Prisons, (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story 
/story.php?storyId=5780585. 
 16. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 17. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 18. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 19. 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 20. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 14. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.B. See also Rapa, supra note 11, at 237–40 for further 
discussion of the English common law roots of an executive secrecy privilege. 
 22. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). 
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1807.23 Though not mentioned in Reynolds, one commentator also 
identified principles justifying government secrecy as early as 1803 in 
Marbury v. Madison.24 Both of these cases involved claims by members 
of the Jefferson administration of an executive privilege to refuse 
evidence to the courts. 
Marbury was a civil case in which the plaintiff, a Federalist 
appointed at the last minute by the outgoing Adams administration, 
sought to compel the new Democratic Republican officials to admit that 
his commission indeed existed and was in their possession. The new 
administration based their refusal on the confidentiality prerogative of 
executive branch offices. The Court soundly rejected this theory25 
because whether the commission existed or not was deemed not to be a 
fact that required the protection afforded by secrecy.26 From this case 
Halperin and Hoffman identified two general principles regarding 
government secrecy: “that there exists, in principle, a category of 
privileged, ‘confidential’ executive communications; but that the Court, 
in a proper case, has power to review the propriety of a claim of 
privilege.”27
Burr, on the other hand, was a criminal case28 in which the defendant 
sought to compel production of letters written to President Jefferson both 
to impeach the main prosecution witness and embarrass the 
administration internationally. Again the government refused, this time 
because of the private nature of the communications between the 
president and his advisor.29 John Marshall, sitting as justice on the circuit 
court, held that the defendant’s need for the evidence and the 
government’s need for secrecy must be weighed against each other, and 
that a defendant’s need would not always be overridden by the 
government’s privilege.30 Justice Marshall ordered production of the 
letters requested and President Jefferson complied, with portions of the 
 23. See id. at 7 n.18 (citing U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807)). 
 24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 99–100 
(discussing Marbury v. Madison). 
 25. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 141–42. 
 26. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 100. 
 27. Id. 
 28. This distinction is important because it was used by the Court in Reynolds in refusing to 
apply by analogy the consequences of the government’s refusal to produce evidence in criminal 
cases (i.e., the accused goes free) to the civil forum. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). 
Nevertheless, the Reynolds court did cite to Burr as precedent for executive secrecy. Id. at 7 n. 18. 
 29. U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 31 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807). 
 30. Id. at 37 (“If [the letter] does contain any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, 
which it is not the wish of the executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and 
essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be suppressed.” (emphasis added)). 
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letters deleted.31 It is important to note that in making his order, Justice 
Marshall was aware of the content of the letters32 and, while still showing 
due respect to a coequal branch of government, did not accept the 
executive’s assertions at face value. 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were only 
very rare occasions on which the executive branch thought it necessary 
to use secrecy, though it treated many of these occasions as opportunities 
to carve out a small area of executive privilege.33 All of these occasions 
involved foreign diplomacy or war, and the reaction of Congress and 
private citizens was always to deny executive claims of an inherent, 
unlimited prerogative to withhold information.34 One important 
precedent to come from this period was Totten v. United States35 in 
which the Court denied a suit for unpaid wages by the administrator of a 
Civil War spy’s estate. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent had a 
secret contract with the late President Lincoln for espionage services. In 
denying the administrator’s claim, the Court reasoned, 
 
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the 
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would 
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards 
as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to 
be violated. . . . Much greater reason exists for the application of the 
principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government, 
as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be 
disclosed.36
 
Later courts would call on this general principle of secrecy to support 
their arguments against allowing into evidence secret information that 
“might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or 
endanger the person or injure the character of the agent”37 if disclosed. 
It was not until World War II, however, that this general principle 
was institutionalized in the form of a broad and pervasive secrecy 
 31. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 100. 
 32. Id. at 101. 
 33. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 43–50, 331–39 (discussing secrecy in the Jay Treaty 
controversy, the Sedition Act, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and President Wilson’s negotiations 
at Versailles). 
 34. Id. See also HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 98–115. This is not to say that there 
were no other occasions in case law in which a governmental evidentiary privilege was recognized 
by American courts. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 n.11 (1953). In each of these cases, however, 
the privilege was highly individualized and strictly limited by the courts. 
 35. 92 U.S. 105 (1876). 
 36. Id. at 107. 
 37. Id. at 106. 
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privilege. Secrecy was utilized more frequently in the context of a dire 
global war and, therefore, was progressively legitimized as a tool for 
regular instead of rare use.38 After Germany and Japan surrendered, the 
Allied Nations split into communist and democratic blocks and the need 
for secrecy (or, at least, the perception of a need for secrecy) continued 
into peacetime. 
 
B.  The Growth of Secrecy and United States v. Reynolds 
 
As the nation settled into its role as a global superpower and the 
principal adversary to the communist nations after World War II, the 
consistent sense of threat gave national security an enhanced and 
permanent importance and fueled the executive’s newfound penchant for 
secrecy.39 Presidents Truman and Eisenhower issued Executive Orders 
that extended the legitimacy of classifying information into peacetime, 
and expanded the authority to classify from the military into nearly all 
executive departments.40 These orders accompanied the growth of the 
peacetime military and intelligence communities who harbored an innate 
belief in secrecy as necessity (and, arguably, the belief that no secrecy 
was excessive).41 In this context, the Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Reynolds42 in 1953 and thereby defined the parameters of the 
state secrets privilege. 
In Reynolds, an Air Force research and development flight crashed in 
Georgia killing six of its nine passengers. Widows of the civilian victims 
brought suit against the government claiming negligence and, during 
discovery, moved for production of the official investigation reports and 
survivors’ statements held by the Air Force. Alleging that disclosure of 
these documents threatened to reveal military technology secrets, and 
therefore threatened national security, the government moved to quash 
the plaintiffs’ motion for discovery.43 In support of its motion, the 
government cited only an internal Air Force regulation prohibiting 
dissemination of official reports “to persons outside the authorized chain 
 38. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 117–19, 339. 
 39. Id. at 339–45. 
 40. Id. at 340. See also Note, Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and 
Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1189–1207 (1972) [hereinafter National Security & Civil 
Liberties] (giving an overview of the information security system of the executive branch, including 
Executive Orders 10501 and 11652, neither of which had any statutory basis). 
 41. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 340–41, 344; Zagel, supra note 7, at 898 (listing 
problematic national security classifications by the executive departments). 
 42. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). “In the instant case we cannot escape judicial notice that this is a time 
of vigorous preparation for national defense.” Id. at 10. 
 43. Id. at 1–4. 
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of command without the specific approval of the Secretary of the Air 
Force.”44
Later, the Secretary of the Air Force filed a formal “Claim of 
Privilege,” which stated that compulsion of the evidence sought by 
plaintiffs would be prejudicial to national security, and indicated, 
specifically yet without revealing the information he sought to protect, 
how disclosure would harm the security interest. This claim was 
accompanied by an affidavit from the Air Force Judge Advocate General 
reiterating the threat that production posed to the nation’s security and 
offering to produce the three survivors who could testify about anything 
that was not classified.45
Both the district court46 and the Third Circuit47 held for the plaintiffs, 
finding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 required production of 
the requested documents.48 The law seemed clear. The Federal Tort 
Claims Act divested the federal government of sovereign immunity and 
applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against the government.49 
Air Force regulations creating a privilege to withhold could not trump 
such express congressional intent. There was no statute authorizing the 
Air Force’s claim of privilege,50 neither was there judicial precedent 
clearly on point for such a claim.51 Consequently, the lower courts held 
that the government’s refusal to produce the evidence resulted in the 
establishment of the facts on the issue of negligence in the plaintiffs’ 
favor.52
It also seemed clear, however, that strict compliance with the Federal 
 44. Id. at 4 n.4. 
 45. Id. at 4–5. 
 46. Reynolds v. U.S., 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Penn. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 47. Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 48. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4 (1953). 
 49. Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987, 993 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 50. To be clear, the Air Force motion to quash and “Claim of Privilege” did cite to one 
statute—5 U.S.C. § 22—but this merely authorizes “[t]he head of each [executive] department to 
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department.” Reynolds, 
345 U.S. at 4 n.4. It says nothing about withholding information, but instead vitiates the Air Force 
regulation creating the privilege since that regulation was inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One historian to treat the matter concluded that the executive 
department’s entire classification system and information protection methods derived entirely from 
internal administrative policy for executive employees. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 341. Another 
commentator called the Air Force’s citation an illustration of “the Government’s propensity to use 
inapposite authority to support policies justified on other grounds,” and noted that Congress 
amended the statute after Reynolds, adding: “This section does not authorize withholding 
information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.” Zagel, supra note 7, 
at 900–01. 
 51. See U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953) (“Judicial experience with the privilege which 
protects military and state secrets has been limited in this country.”). 
 52. Id. at 5. 
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Tort Claims Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would 
introduce military secrets into the public record. Thus, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, reasoning that, 
although not directly treated by statute or case law, “the principles which 
control the application of the privilege emerge quite clearly from the 
available precedents.”53 These principles are: (1) the state secrets 
privilege is a public tool and can be asserted by the government only; (2) 
the privilege is not to be lightly invoked; (3) the government must follow 
proper procedure in invoking a claim to the privilege; (4) the courts 
retain limited judicial oversight of the privilege’s use;54 and (5) the 
privilege, once applied, is absolute.55
The Court enumerated three procedural requirements: the complaint 
must be formal, “lodged by the head of the department which has control 
over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.”56 
There are two likely sources for these procedural requirements. One 
source is certainly English case law, specifically Duncan v. Cammell, 
Laird & Co.,57 cited by the Supreme Court in its decision.58 In addition to 
Duncan, the allusions to a secrecy privilege in early American case law 
such as Marbury and Burr may have inspired the modern-day procedural 
requirements, though this inspiration was not ostensibly recognized by 
the Court in Reynolds. In each of these early cases President Jefferson 
was personally involved in the decision to withhold information, as 
opposed to some mid- to low-level administrator making the decision.59
An ostensibly important principle elucidated by Reynolds is judicial 
oversight of state secrets claims. The Court held that it “itself must 
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of 
privilege, and yet do so without forcing disclosure of the very thing the 
privilege is designed to protect.”60 Recognizing the difficulty of this role, 
 53. Id. at 7. 
 54. Id. at 7–8. 
 55. “Where there is a strong showing of necessity [for the evidence], the claim of privilege 
should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of 
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.” Id. at 11. 
 56. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. 
 57. (1942) 111 A.C. 624. (K.B.). See generally Zagel, supra note 7, at 888–91 (discussing the 
influence of Duncan on Reynolds). 
 58. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.15, 20–22. 
 59. Subsequent to Reynolds this procedural requirement became the only part of the state 
secrets privilege rule to be strictly enforced against the government. See, e.g., Nat’l Lawyers Guild 
v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a formal claim of privilege is 
required for each item for which protection from discovery is sought, and that the FBI could not use 
a sampling technique in making its state secrets claim); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (holding that the court would not recognize a state secrets claim until it had been made by a 
responsible officer who had personally considered it). 
 60. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. 
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the Court formulated what has come to be known as the “reasonable 
danger” standard: while judicial control over evidence must be 
maintained, where the executive can show that there is a reasonable 
danger that compelled disclosure of the evidence will expose sensitive 
information, the court should not insist upon examining the evidence in 
question, even in camera, and should determine that the privilege 
applies.61
The curtailed role of the courts in assessing the validity of a state 
secrets claim has been a target of criticism in litigation and commentary. 
According to Zagel, one of the earliest to examine the state secrets 
privilege, Duncan limited “the judge’s function in state secrets cases . . . 
to ascertaining whether the claim is made by the proper officer in the 
proper form,”62 that is, a judge must only consider whether the 
procedural requirement had been met. Zagel argued that Reynolds was an 
ultimately futile attempt at compromise between the lower courts’ 
permissive enforcement of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the English courts’ rubber-stamp approval of executive 
procedure.63 Writing before the Halkin decisions, he prophetically 
concluded that 
 
there is no middle ground and that the Reynolds compromise is illusory. 
In the final analysis, if the court does not examine the information, it 
must decide in the dark. Thus, the executive will almost always 
determine the legal question of privilege. For all practical purposes, the 
rules of Reynolds and Duncan are identical. . . . The issue of whether 
the court should make an independent examination of the material in 
question or simply accept the executive’s sworn assertion of the 
privilege, remains unresolved.64
 
Thus, although Reynolds sought to balance the role of the judiciary in 
controlling the evidence in its courts with the executive’s need for 
secrecy, the rule it adopted was fated to favor executive claims of 





 61. Id. at 10. 
 62. Zagel, supra note 7, at 888. 
 63. Id. at 891. 
 64. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
  
231] THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 245 
 
C.  The Halkin Catch-22:65 Abdication of Oversight by the Judiciary 
 
The influence of Duncan on American state secrets jurisprudence has 
been underestimated, considering the subsequent application of the 
Reynolds “reasonable danger” standard in Halkin I66 and Halkin II.67 In 
principle, “[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case [has not been] 
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”68 In practice, however, the 
role of the courts has become merely to ensure that the executive has 
complied with the formalities of invoking the privilege.69 This result was 
realized chiefly by the two District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
decisions that dispensed with the Halkin plaintiffs’ cases. 
Along with the rise of the national security apparatus—intelligence 
agencies, classification systems, security bureaucracies, and a peacetime 
military establishment—came highly controversial national policies that 
engendered significant dissent in the American public, such as the 
Vietnam War. Additionally, technological advances have enabled 
increasingly furtive surveillance by the government. This approaching 
perfect storm needed one more element to break— an increasingly 
paranoid and secretive executive branch, which reached its zenith with 
the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency. 
 
1.  Halkin I: The sophisticated intelligence analyst, inconsistent 
invocation, and absolutism 
 
Halkin was among various other protesters against the Vietnam War 
who were subjects of warrantless and, therefore, arguably illegal 
surveillance by the NSA.70 Such surveillance was commonly requested 
by intelligence agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.71 The targeted protesters sued for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against two particular NSA programs: MINARET and 
SHAMROCK. The MINARET program used “watchlists” with the 
plaintiffs’ names on them to search for them in mountains of data 
collected from overseas electronic communications, while the 
 65. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 7, at 340. 
 66. Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 67. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 68. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953). 
 69. See HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 104. 
 70. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1)–(22) (2002) (Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime 
Control Act of 1968 prohibits interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications 
without a warrant). 
 71. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 4–5. 
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SHAMROCK program did likewise with plaintiffs’ telegraphic 
communications.72 Details about SHAMROCK had been disclosed 
previously in congressional hearings and in the proceedings of Jabara v. 
Kelley.73
The NSA responded with a motion for dismissal, arguing that 
discovery and merely filing a responsive pleading would require them to 
disclose secret information, which would severely jeopardize the 
agency’s intelligence collection mission.74 On the other hand, the danger 
of dismissal was obvious: perhaps the Nixon administration really had 
used the NSA to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional protections through 
illegal surveillance and the claim of national security was yet another 
cover-up attempt to avoid liability. Carefully weighing the needs of each 
side, the district court decided for the defendants with regard to 
MINARET, but held that prior disclosures about SHAMROCK negated 
the state secrets privilege and discovery of such evidence would be 
compelled.75 Both parties appealed. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided that both programs fell within 
the purview of the state secrets privilege. Three issues of particular 
import surfaced in coming to that conclusion: (1) whether the state 
secrets privilege could extend to something so minimal as plaintiffs’ 
request for affirmation or denial that their communications had been 
intercepted; (2) whether prior disclosures about SHAMROCK barred 
application of the state secrets privilege; and (3) whether the plaintiffs 
were improperly denied an opportunity to test the defendant’s claims 
because of their exclusion from in camera proceedings.76 In resolving 
each of these issues, the court accomplished a piecemeal abdication of its 
judicial oversight responsibility. 
a.  The sophisticated intelligence analyst. Plaintiffs made a minimal 
request for a “yes-or-no” answer to the question of whether they had 
been monitored. In denying that request, the court opined that any 
answer could jeopardize national security. In its rationale, the court 
created the “sophisticated intelligence analyst” standard as a subset of the 
“reasonable danger” standard articulated in Reynolds.77 Borrowing 
language from United States v. Marchetti,78 a First Amendment prior 
 72. Id. 
 73. 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
 74. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 4. 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. Id. at 5–9. 
 77. Id. at 9–10 (“There is a ‘reasonable danger’ that confirmation or denial that a particular 
plaintiff’s communications have been acquired would disclose NSA capabilities and other valuable 
intelligence information to a sophisticated intelligence analyst.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 78. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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restraint dispute between the CIA and a former employee, the court 
justified its profound deference to executive assertions: 
 
The significance of one item of information may frequently depend 
upon knowledge of many other items of information. What may seem 
trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a 
broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of 
information in its proper context. The courts, of course, are ill-equipped 
to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve 
effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in that area.79
 
Almost anything could be deemed useful by a sophisticated intelligence 
analyst. With this liberal standard in place, the executive has an 
exceedingly wide scope of information that can claim to be within the 
protection of the state secrets privilege. Indeed, the liberality of this 
standard of review is one of the most frequent criticisms of the state 
secrets doctrine in particular, and government secrecy in general.80 This 
broad standard is one of the steps the court took away from meaningful 
evaluation of the executive’s claims for the need for secrecy, and toward 
the role of rubber-stamping fulfillment of the procedural requirements. 
b.  Inconsistent invocation of the privilege. The plaintiffs in Halkin I 
argued that the government’s admission to having intercepted 
communications in the public record of Jabara was indistinguishable 
from the information they sought to obtain through their interrogatories 
about SHAMROCK. They argued, therefore, that the information should 
be removed from the domain of state secrets since it was no longer a 
secret at all. The D.C. Circuit summarily rejected this argument under the 
“sophisticated intelligence analyst” standard, holding that “[t]he 
government is not estopped from concluding in one case that disclosure 
is permissible while in another case it is not.”81 This is a curious 
argument for the skeptic of government secrecy. It is difficult to imagine 
what an enemy analyst might deduce about the NSA’s capabilities from 
disclosure of the fact that it intercepted Mr. Halkin’s communications 
that such an analyst could not have already discovered with knowledge 
about the interception of Mr. Jabara’s communications. Of course, the 
reply prescribed by the sophisticated intelligence analyst standard to this 
 79. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8–9 (citing U.S. v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
 80. Christopher Brancart, Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 9–13 
(1987); Gardner, supra note 8, at 585–86; Zagel, supra note 7, at 878–80; Military & State Secrets 
Privilege, supra note 7, at 573–76; National Security & Civil Liberties, supra note 40, at 1134–89. 
See also supra note 34 and accompanying text as well as discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 81. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9. 
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skepticism would be that only executive officials and foreign intelligence 
analysts could know the difference, and citizens and judges are simply 
incompetent to assess the executive’s assertion. It seems more plausible, 
however, that this reasoning is a more complex way for the court to say, 
“We defer to the executive in everything on national security.” The 
court’s extensive use of the sophisticated intelligence analyst standard is 
tantamount to complete deference to the executive will in matters of 
secrecy. 
c.  Absolutism. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that their exclusion from 
the lower court’s in camera review of classified executive affidavits 
showing the need for secrecy yielded too much control over the case to 
the NSA.82 As an example, they pointed to the district court’s nearly 
verbatim inclusion of the defense counsel’s findings of fact into its 
opinion. Plaintiffs claimed a right to be included, under protective order, 
in the in camera proceedings.83 The court rejected this assertion holding 
that “[t]he state secrets privilege is absolute”84 and overrides any other 
competing interest, no matter how compelling. Here plaintiffs were 
seeking the “benefit of criticism and illumination by [the] party with the 
actual interest in forcing disclosure,” but the court concluded that not 
even well-informed and balanced advocacy can outweigh the value of 
protecting a state secret. 85
The court’s logic is circular: The plaintiffs may not participate in the 
determination of whether the state secrets privilege applies because the 
privilege is absolute once applied. Accordingly, the court held that 
plaintiffs may not even participate under a protective order because of 
the mere potentiality that revealing sensitive information might be too 
advantageous to plaintiffs to resist violating the order. This reasoning 
reveals the imbalance of the court’s deferential evaluation of claims of 
executive privilege. Whereas on one side the risk of disclosure of 
allegedly sensitive information is weighted so heavily as to prevent 
normal adjudicative proceedings fundamental to justice, on the other side 
the risk of abuse of the state secrets privilege to shield illegal actions, 
incompetence, waste, or negligence did not seem to weigh at all on the 
court’s application of the Reynolds rule. Once again, it becomes clear 
that the underlying thrust of the court’s reasoning is absolute deference 
to the executive. If an executive official merely invokes the state secrets 
privilege, a court must defer to executive judgment and allow secrecy, 
even before the court makes any independent determination that the 
 82. Id. at 7. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. at 7. 
 85. Id. at 6–7 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
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privilege is appropriate. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit was explicit in its 
opinion on the matter, stating, “[c]ourts should accord the ‘utmost 
deference’ to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of military 
or diplomatic secrets.”86
Because the state secrets privilege afforded some defendants, namely 
the NSA, an airtight lock around the evidence necessary to prove the 
plaintiffs’ case, the lower court dismissed the complaint as to those 
defendants on remand.87
 
2.  Halkin II: Strengthening state secrets 
 
After dismissal of the complaint against the NSA on remand, the 
plaintiffs renewed their action against the other intelligence agencies that 
remained in Halkin II. They argued that although the state secrets 
privilege prevented discovery of the NSA programs at issue, it did not 
foreclose a case against the CIA for having submitted the watchlists to 
the NSA “on a presumption that the submission of a name resulted in 
interception of the named person’s communications.”88 To show their 
injury, the plaintiffs required evidence that they were included on the 
CIA lists submitted to the NSA for surveillance. Discovery in the district 
court revealed that some of the CIA’s domestic surveillance programs, 
including Operation CHAOS, had targeted many of the plaintiffs. 
Through these programs, the CIA collaborated with other security 
agencies, including the FBI and the NSA, to produce a steady stream of 
reports on the plaintiffs and to infiltrate their organizations with 
undercover agents.89 This revelation and other public disclosures about 
the intelligence programs led to still further discovery requests.90 The 
CIA produced many of the documents requested, but asserted the state 
secrets privilege in withholding much of the evidence crucial to 
establishing the plaintiffs’ claims. When the district court upheld the 
claim of privilege and subsequently dismissed the case on summary 
judgment, the plaintiffs appealed.91
 86. Id. at 9 (citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). It should be noted that the 
statement in Nixon on which the court relies is dicta which relies itself on dicta from an earlier case 
superseded by Reynolds. Gardner, supra note 8, at 588 (“The discussion in Nixon that the 
constitutional basis of the state secrets privilege derives from the President’s Article II powers, itself 
pure dicta, is based upon language in precedent which is also dicta, and which has been seriously 
questioned. . . .” (quoting Barry A. Stulberg, Comment, State Secrets Privilege: The Executive 
Caprice Runs Rampant, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 471 (1987)). 
 87. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 981–83. 
 90. Id. at 984–85. 
 91. Id. at 988. 
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Once again, the D.C. Circuit decided in favor of the government and 
sustained its refusal to produce material evidence. The court’s reasoning 
further entrenched its deference to the executive’s assertion of privilege 
by severely limiting its consideration of plaintiff’s interest in the crucial 
information the CIA withheld. Furthermore, it demonstrated the strength 
of its holding in Halkin I that the privilege is absolute by denying the 
plaintiffs standing because they could not show injury in fact without the 
evidence protected by the privilege.92
a.  Limiting the influence of the party seeking disclosure. The 
plaintiffs argued that the district court did not balance both parties’ 
competing interests properly because it afforded great weight to the 
government’s need for secrecy with comparatively little regard for the 
privilege’s fatal repercussions on the plaintiffs’ case.93 The D.C. Circuit 
responded by reiterating the Reynolds rule that “invocation [of the 
privilege] must be carefully considered to assure that the proper balance 
is struck between the interest of the public and the litigant in vindicating 
private rights and the public’s interest in safeguarding of the national 
security.”94 But then the court eviscerated this principle by declaring that 
“the need for the information demonstrated by the party seeking 
disclosure . . . is a factor only in determining the extent of the court’s 
inquiry into the appropriateness of the claim.”95 Thus, 
 
the critical feature of the inquiry in evaluating the claim of privilege is 
not a balancing of ultimate interests at stake in the litigation. That 
balance has already been struck. Rather, the determination is whether 
the showing of the harm that might reasonably be seen to flow from 
disclosure is adequate in a given case to trigger the absolute right to 
withhold the information sought in that case.96
 
The issue was not whether the lower court compared the parties’ interests 
fairly, but whether the government had made a sufficient showing of 
“reasonable danger.”97
Given the “sophisticated intelligence analyst” standard discussed 
above,98 it was not difficult for the CIA to make a showing that harm 
might reasonably result from disclosure.99 The plaintiffs had conceded 
 92. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 977–1000 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 93. Id. at 990. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 98. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.a. 
 99. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 991–92. 
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that the procedural requirement had been met, so the court moved on to 
the question of whether the showing itself was adequate.100 The court 
called upon the sophisticated intelligence analyst principle to illustrate 
that it was “self-evident” that disclosure here posed a reasonable 
danger.101 Because the public affidavit so easily met this low standard, 
the court did not find it necessary even to reach the plaintiffs’ objection 
at having been denied the opportunity to challenge the CIA’s in camera 
affidavit in the district court.102
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ analogy to judicial 
interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in Vaughn v. 
Rosen.103 When refusing to disclose information requested under FOIA, 
the executive department claiming exemption must complete a detailed 
explanation of its refusal to disclose, often called a Vaughn index.104 
Plaintiffs here sought a compromise that would allow the government to 
protect information while affording minimal accountability to its 
constituents by justifying withholding of information.105 The D.C. Circuit 
refused even this in an astonishing display of deference to the executive 
branch: 
 
the claim of state secrets privilege is a decision of policy made at the 
highest level of the executive branch after consideration of the facts of 
the particular case. . . . [W]here the only question is whether 
information has been deemed by the executive to be so sensitive as to 
pose a risk to national security were it disclosed, a more detailed 
statement of the characteristics of the withheld information would serve 
no useful end.106
 
The result was that the need of the party seeking disclosure became 
almost irrelevant, a straw man to be got around with a minimal showing 
of reasonable danger. The balancing envisioned by the Supreme Court in 
Burr and Reynolds was impossible because it 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 993. 
 102. Id. at 995. 
 103. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 104. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 995 (“. . . a ‘Vaughn index’ itemize[es] each instance of claimed 
exemption, describing the document involved, and stating the specific exemption(s) asserted to 
apply. The index may be supplemented with representative exhibits . . . and in some cases with in 
camera submissions which make evident the need for confidentiality.”). 
 105. Id. Arguably the plaintiffs hoped to force the point that the intelligence agencies could 
not justify refusal to disclose and that the surveillance was in fact part of the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations’ illegal covert actions against domestic political opponents. 
 106. Id. at 996 (emphasis added). 
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force[d] the judge to rule in a vacuum. He must determine necessity 
without knowing the contents of the requested document and their 
value to the requesting party. . . . Since the judge is adrift in a sea of 
unknowns, it is hard to imagine a case in which the Government cannot 
plausibly argue that military secrets are at stake.107
 
In this way American state secrets jurisprudence arrived at the English 
Duncan rule of extreme deference to the executive. The court essentially 
reduced application of the state secrets privilege “to ascertaining whether 
the claim is made by the proper officer in the proper form.”108
b.  No discovery, no standing. Upon determining that the privilege 
applied, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ case for want of 
standing.109 The plaintiffs were suing for declaratory and injunctive relief 
enforcing the protections of the Fourth Amendment. They argued that the 
government had not invoked the privilege to protect discovery of 
whether the CIA submitted their names to the NSA, and that submission 
of their names implied surveillance of their communications and 
sufficient risk of injury such that equitable relief was warranted.110
The court held that for a plaintiff to sustain an injury from 
surveillance by the government, the surveillance must be unlawful. 
Consequently, for submission itself of the plaintiffs’ names to the NSA 
to constitute an injury warranting equitable relief, the plaintiffs must 
show that submission might lead to an unlawful search, not merely the 
probability of surveillance alone. The problem with the plaintiffs’ 
position, reasoned the court, is that it was unknown whether the NSA’s 
surveillance was unlawful and, because of the state secrets privilege, it is 
also unknowable. Therefore, “appellants’ inability to adduce proof of 
actual acquisition of their communications now prevents them from 
stating a claim cognizable in federal courts. In particular, we find 
appellants incapable of making the showing necessary to establish their 
standing to seek relief.”111
This is the Halkin Catch-22: plaintiffs are denied discovery of the 
very evidence that would save their case from the lack of standing for 
which it was dismissed. In other words, when the government is the 
defendant it may eviscerate the case against it, first, by invoking the state 
secrets privilege, thereby denying the plaintiff the evidence necessary to 
 107. Zagel, supra note 7, at 891. 
 108. Id. at 888 (referring to the English rule in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 
624 (K.B.)). 
 109. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 997–1007. 
 110. Id. at 997. 
 111. Id. at 998. 
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shield from dismissal for lack of standing, failure to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted,112 or from summary judgment, and then 
move to dismiss because the plaintiff lacks the very evidence the 
government is withholding. Herein we see the severity of the state secrets 
privilege. The plaintiffs’ prayer for relief from possible Fourth 
Amendment violations was destroyed by an unproven, unreviewable, 
vague, and cursory assertion by the executive that disclosure might 
implicate national security. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Reynolds rule, which has metamorphosed into something more 
appropriately called the Duncan-Halkin rule, is not compatible with 
American constitutional principles. The federal government is one of 
separated powers that should preclude the executive from determining 
the extent of its own privilege in a lawsuit to which it is a party. Effective 
judicial oversight is required to provide a forum in which an aggrieved 
citizen may seek redress peacefully. Furthermore, a healthy republic 
requires oversight of the government by an informed citizenry. 
Systematic secrecy in the government is an obstacle to these ends. For 
these reasons, the United States Government should return to the candor 
and openness that characterized its control of information before World 
War II. As a coequal branch of government, the courts should abandon 
the Duncan-Halkin rule for a method of protecting state secrets that is 
more amenable to public oversight and redress by reasserting the judicial 
oversight it has abandoned over the last 50 years of state secrets 
jurisprudence. 
 
A.  Separation of Powers 
 
It is improper, indeed a miscarriage of justice, for a man to be a 
judge in his own case.113 In essence, this is what the Duncan-Halkin rule 
has made of the executive branch in state secrets cases. Arguably, 
Reynolds sought to avoid this, asserting, “Judicial control over the 
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive 
officers.”114 The Halkin rulings, however, have made judicial oversight 
merely nominal, a certification that procedure was followed correctly. 
Some have agreed that the Halkin cases are not true to the more 
 112. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 113. Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.). See generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY, 15–32 (2003). 
 114. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953). 
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moderate Reynolds rule. One commentator,115 writing between the 
Halkin I and Halkin II decisions, noted that lower courts were taking a 
mechanical approach to the procedure of Reynolds while ignoring the 
Supreme Court’s mandate that “the court must be satisfied from all the 
evidence and circumstances, and ‘from the implications of the question, 
in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the 
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be 
dangerous’”116 in order to find that the claim of privilege is appropriate. 
Thus, in the Halkin cases, the D.C. Circuit failed to account for important 
distinctions between the claim of privilege there and the claim in 
Reynolds, distinctions that may have ameliorated the harsh outcome of 
those decisions.117
Another commentator noted that Burr, one of the precedents for 
secrecy upon which Reynolds relies, charges the court with responsibility 
to balance the ultimate interests of both parties.118 Justice Marshall 
identified the need for presidential discretion at times, but concluded that 
the requesting party’s “occasion for demanding [privileged evidence] 
ought . . . be very strong, and to be fully shown to the court.” He 
continued, though, stating that “[p]erhaps the court ought to consider the 
reasons, which would induce the president to refuse to exhibit [the 
evidence] as conclusive on it, unless such [evidence] could be shown to 
be absolutely necessary in the defense [i.e., to the opponent party’s 
case].”119 It is clear that Justice Marshall considered a central, informed 
role for the court in balancing the “ultimate interests”120 of the party not 
asserting the privilege (as opposed to its merely assessing a minimal 
showing of reasonable danger by the executive). Of course, Burr was a 
criminal case, but there has been no satisfactory rationale offered for the 
difference in how the claim of privilege is treated between civil and 
criminal cases. To the contrary, civil cases like Reynolds and Halkin I 
have cited often to criminal cases that have dealt with claims of 
executive privilege based on national security, like Burr and United 
States v. Nixon.121 It is clear from the precedents upon which the state 
 115. Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 573–78. 
 116. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9. 
 117. Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 577–78 (“In Reynolds, the executive 
was not suspected of intentionally invading the plaintiffs’ rights or of using the privilege to defeat 
the plaintiffs’ case. The Supreme Court upheld the privilege . . . after the Secretary [of the Air Force] 
provided an alternative source for the information sought by the plaintiffs.”) 
 118. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 100. 
 119. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 55 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807)) (emphasis added). 
 120. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 121. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.18 (citing to “Marshall, C.J., in the Aaron Burr trial, I 
Robertson’s Reports 186”); Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing to U.S. v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
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secrets privilege is founded that the courts are to assert more oversight of 
privilege claims. 
We can see the challenges to the separation of powers posed by the 
state secrets privilege in four recent cases challenging the NSA’s 
warrantless counterterrorism surveillance program.122 They illustrate the 
power of the executive over the admission of evidence, a right normally 
belonging to the courts. As noted in the introduction, the NSA has been 
monitoring American citizens without warrants for about five years now. 
This warrantless surveillance program has been acknowledged publicly 
by the president,123 the U.S. Attorney General,124 and the Department of 
Justice.125 Contrary to the Attorney General’s vague assertions about the 
program’s legality, the Congressional Research Service concluded that 
the wiretapping was probably illegal.126 The ACLU and the Al-Haramain 
Islamic Foundation initiated actions against the government for relief 
from the allegedly illegal surveillance, much like the plaintiffs in Halkin 
I.127 Hepting and Terkel, on the other hand, sued their 
telecommunications provider for injuries that flowed from AT&T’s 
alleged collaboration with the government in surrendering their records 
to the NSA.128 In each case the government moved for dismissal because 
discovery and responsive pleadings would involve disclosures that bear 
the mere potential of jeopardizing national security. 129
In each case “[t]he courts upheld the privilege as to those alleged 
aspects of the program which were not made public, including alleged 
tracking of the phone records of millions of Americans, but denied it as 
to the aspect which the government publicly disclosed, monitoring 
 122. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ore. 2006); Am. 
Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Terkel v. AT&T 
Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Cal. 
2006). 
 123. President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news 
/releases/2005/12/20051217.html 
 124. White House Press Briefing, supra note 14. 
 125. U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President, (Jan. 19, 2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. 
 126. Compare White House Press Briefing, supra note 14 (defending the NSA program), with 
CRS Report, supra note 14 at 44 (concluding that the executive’s legal justification of the NSA 
program was not “well-grounded” and a court probably would not hold it to be valid). Indeed, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan so held in August, 2006. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 773–759 (holding that the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program 
violates the Fourth and First Amendments and the separation of powers). 
 127. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758; Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 
451 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
 128. Terkel, 441 F Supp. 2d at 901; Hepting 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
 129. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1224–25; Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
438 F. Supp. 2d at 758–59; Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 904; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979–80. 
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communications between suspected al Qaeda members based in America 
and their cohorts abroad.”130 To uphold the government’s assertion of the 
privilege over information that it had publicly acknowledged would be to 
make the courts complicit in argument that is “disingenuous and without 
merit.”131 The government failed in asserting the privilege only because 
of its repeated public disclosures of the program. The courts made it 
clear that if the government had kept silent after the NSA program was 
leaked the privilege would have upheld.132 Indeed, the standard set forth 
in Hepting is that “[i]n determining whether a factual statement is a 
secret for purposes of the state secrets privilege, the court should look 
only at publicly reported information that possesses substantial indicia of 
reliability . . . .”133 Thus, in determining whether information about 
AT&T’s cooperation with the NSA was secret or not, the court held that 
it “considers only public admissions or denials by the government, 
AT&T and other telecommunications companies . . . .”134 In other words, 
the admissibility of such evidence is still dependent upon the defendants’ 
discretion to disclose information. If, in the future, defendants in 
possession of sensitive information wish to keep it out of court, they 
simply need to refrain from making any public pronouncement about it. 
In this way, the executive can control the admissibility of evidence, even 
if it is indirectly. 
Perhaps the most poignant illustration of this control is found in Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation.135 Here, plaintiffs were seeking to admit 
evidence that they had been targets of the NSA’s surveillance.136 Defense 
counsel inadvertently sent a classified document to plaintiffs’ counsel 
which stated that the plaintiffs were, indeed, subjects of surveillance.137 
The court held that the information known to all parties was nevertheless 
a privileged secret.138 It reasoned, 
 
because the government has not officially confirmed or denied whether 
plaintiffs were subject to surveillance, even if plaintiffs know they 
were, this information remains a secret. Furthermore, while plaintiffs 
 130. Rapa, supra note 11, at 260 n.213. 
 131. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 766. 
 132. See, e.g., id. at 765 (holding that information which was publicly disclosed is no longer 
secret, but that any other information which the government did not choose to acknowledge was 
protected, resulting in the dismissal of this part of the ACLU’s claim). 
 133. 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ore. 2006). 
 136. Id. at 1218. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1223, 1228–29. 
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know the contents of the Sealed Document, it too remains secret. . . . 
[T]he government did not waive its state secrets privilege by its 
inadvertent disclosure of the document.”139
 
That is, even though the NSA surveillance program had been 
acknowledged publicly by administration officials, and it had become 
common knowledge to all parties that the plaintiffs were subjects of this 
program (knowledge that was subsequently published to the world in a 
court reporter), it can still be excluded as a state secret! This is, again, the 
court allowing the government to “put the cat back in the bag” when it 
faces liability.140
If the executive is engaged in illegal activity, it violates the principle 
of separation of powers to allow the executive to control what is admitted 
into evidence in the trial adjudicating that same activity. By refusing to 
admit evidence of such activity unless it is officially acknowledged by 
the very party with an interest in excluding it, the Duncan-Halkin rule 
gives the executive this undue control, albeit indirectly. Thus, a program 
widely believed to violate a federal statute and the Bill of Rights, has 
continued unabated and unsupervised, and its victims left without 
remedy for injuries already sustained, and without judicial recourse to 
protect their constitutional rights in the future. As the D.C. Circuit opined 
earlier in Halkin II, these plaintiffs will be left without judicial remedy 
and must look to Congress.141
 
B.  Oversight Problems 
 
1.  Double abdication 
 
Congress has only rarely been a reliable source for relief from 
government abuse of the individual or the minority. More often, 
Congress has either ignored an aggrieved individual or joined the 
executive in its abuse. The triumph of the individual treated unjustly over 
an oppressive majority has been more often the virtue of the courts than 
the legislatures. The language in Halkin II, however, denies this forum to 
the victims of executive secrecy, and requires them to rely on the 
 139. Id. at 1223. 
 140. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.b. 
 141. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“As in the other cases in which the need 
to protect sensitive information affecting the national security clashes with fundamental 
constitutional rights of individuals, we believe that ‘(t)he responsibility must be where the power is.’ 
In the present context . . . this means that remedies for constitutional violations that cannot be proven 
under existing legal standards, if there are to be such remedies, must be provided by Congress.”) 
(alteration in original, internal citations omitted). 
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unreliable—the political will of the national legislature.142
On March 9, 2006 the Senate Intelligence Committee voted, strictly 
along partisan lines, not to conduct an investigation into the NSA 
wiretapping program143 that Congress’s own legal research center 
concluded was probably illegal.144 Its compromise with the White House 
condoned continued violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act with enhanced congressional oversight.145 There are good reasons to 
believe that this was the politically expedient course of action more than 
it was far-sighted, sound judgment, given the intense political pressure 
from the White House as well as from the public.146 Congressional 
inaction certainly does nothing for those whose communications may 
have been unlawfully monitored. 
An elected legislature will often abdicate its responsibility to protect 
the minority because of its political interest in the majority’s approval. 
This was well understood by the Founders and a fundamental reason 
behind their creation of a strong and independent judiciary.147 When the 
executive violates the constitutional rights of unpopular individuals, the 
injured cannot reasonably look to Congress for a remedy in most 
circumstances. Yet the Duncan-Halkin rule declares that to be their only 
recourse.148 Thus, the wiretapping plaintiffs have the courts foreclosed to 
them (to the extent that the government is not willing to admit publicly to 
its surveillance) and, after the Senate Intelligence Committee’s 
compromise, they have no recourse in Congress either. This inability of 
an individual to stop illegal actions by his government contravenes the 
principles of civil liberty prized by Americans. 
The inability for the aggrieved to seek redress in the courts extends 
well beyond the interception of communications into much more serious 
territory. The allegations brought by Maher Arar and Khaled El-Masri 
involve kidnapping, illegal detention, and torture by federal government 
officials—the nightmare scenario feared by those wary of a police 
state.149 Each was detained, secretly and without warrant, while 
 142. See id. 
 143. See, e.g., Scott Shane & David D. Kirkpatrick, G.O.P. Plan Would Allow Spying Without 
Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A20. 
 144. CRS Report, supra note 14, at 42–44. 
 145. Shane & Kirkpatrick, supra note 143, at A20. 
 146. See, e.g., Gail R. Chaddock, Behind the Deal on NSA Wiretaps, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 9, 2006, at 1 (ascribing the shift of congressional attention from investigating the 
NSA program to challenging the controversial Dubai ports deal to political desire to appear strong 
on national security and to avoid the appearance of weakening counterterrorism measures taken by 
President Bush). 
 147. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 148. See supra note 141. 
 149. See supra note 6. 
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traveling.150 They allege that they were held against their wills by 
American agents, brutally interrogated, and then “rendered” to locales 
within foreign nations, where they were detained without charge or trial 
for several months and tortured routinely.151 After their captors (and 
presumably the intelligence agencies responsible for their renditions) 
were satisfied that they were not threats and did not possess relevant 
information, each was released without apology or compensation.152
They brought claims for their injuries against the U.S. government, 
which, in a motion to dismiss, invoked the state secrets privilege 
claiming that the facts needed to prove their cases are too sensitive to be 
disclosed.153 In all likelihood, there are genuine intelligence methods and 
potentially embarrassing diplomatic arrangements that require protection 
from disclosure in this case. On the other hand, there are also strong 
indications of serious executive error and illegal intelligence activity for 
which protection is sought in secrecy.154 With strong indications that 
“extraordinary renditions” like Mr. Arar’s and Mr. El-Masri’s are fairly 
common practice by American intelligence agencies,155 there is a 
powerful oversight rationale for these cases to proceed. Congress is 
unlikely to be the champion of the cause of suspected terrorists (even 
though it is now clear that label is not applicable to Mr. Arar nor, most 
likely, to Mr. El-Masri). When political considerations make it unlikely 
that the political branches will help the injured, the judiciary is the 
recourse that must remain available. Regrettably, the Duncan-Halkin rule 
appears to close the doors of the courts as well.156 The Duncan-Halkin 
 150. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 
F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–33 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 151. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253–57; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533–35. 
 152. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255; El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–34 (E.D. Va. 
2006). 
 153. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535. See also David Luban, 
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1459 (2005). 
 154. Mr. Arar has been cleared of all suspicion of links to terrorism and the Canadian 
government has been unable to find any factual basis for his detention, rendition to Syria, 
imprisonment, and torture. REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Maher Arar, (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf. See 
also Scott Shane, Torture Victim Had No Terror Link, Canada Told U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2006, at A10; Canadian Inquiry Finds Torture Survivor Maher Arar Completely Innocent, Criticizes 
U.S. For ‘Rendition’ to Syria, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.democracynow.org/ 
article.pl?sid=06/09/19/1348206&mode=thread&tid=25. 
 155. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing 
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set up After 9/11, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01; All Things Considered: Bush Concedes CIA Ran Secret Prisons Abroad (NPR 
radio broadcast, Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=5776968; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “Outsourcing” Torture, (2004). 
 156. See, e.g., Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88 (dismissing on national security grounds other 
than the state secrets privilege); El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (commenting that “it is worth 
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rule allows constitutional liberties to be surrendered too readily to a 
privilege for secrecy that is too easily abused. 
 
2.  The Secrecy System157
 
By sacrificing judicial checks on executive power, the Duncan-
Halkin rule protects government secrecy, whether secrecy is warranted or 
not. Ostensibly, we have traded the oversight that acts as guarantor of our 
civil liberties for a strong national security. But in practice we have 
traded oversight for the ability of the executive to conceal enormous 
amounts of public information, often of dubious relevance to national 
security, at its own discretion. There are even indications that the 
Duncan-Halkin rule’s barrier to effective oversight may actually harm 
national security by hiding incompetence or gross error from public 
scrutiny, accountability, and correction.158
Secrecy is of limited value to a democratic republic. One 
commentator observed in 1966, when it had become apparent that an 
American peacetime military would be permanent, that such an 
establishment would create new demands for secrecy and encourage its 
expansion.159 Concluding that limited secrecy was necessary, he also 
identified “limits on its value.”160 One of the limitations to the value of 
secrecy was the public’s inability to exercise effective oversight: 
“Congress’ ability to supervise the military establishment is a function of 
information. An uninformed Congress must either abdicate its power to 
the knowledgeable or exercise that power blindly.”161 It hardly needs 
mentioning that an ambitious executive would understand and exploit the 
opportunities presented by Congress’s ignorance of matters concealed 
behind the executive veil of Top Secret classifications. The uninformed 
public finds itself in a position similar to that of Congress and, 
suspecting government abuse, must be able to enlist the power of the 
noting that putting aside all the legal issues, if El-Masri’s allegations are true or essentially true, then 
all fair-minded people, including those who believe that state secrets must be protected, that this 
lawsuit cannot proceed, and that renditions are a necessary step to take in this war, must also agree 
that El-Masri has suffered injuries as a result of our country’s mistake and deserves a remedy. Yet, it 
is also clear from the result reached here that the only sources of that remedy must be the Executive 
Branch or the Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch.”). 
 157. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 331–76. 
 158. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 
161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005) (suit by former FBI employee 
for alleged wrongful termination after “blowing the whistle” on FBI failures related to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 dismissed after the government invoked the state secrets privilege); 
and Rapa, supra note 11. 
 159. Zagel, supra note 7, at 878–80. 
 160. Id. at 78. 
 161. Id. 
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courts to inform itself. The Duncan-Halkin rule provides for just the 
opposite: the concerned citizen may not inform himself even in the most 
trivial matters.162
The value of secrecy in a democratic republic is severely limited by 
the inseparably-connected lack of oversight that creates substantial 
hazards for good government. Secrecy and oversight are opposite points 
on a sliding scale: when the law allows a greater portion of secrecy, 
oversight is decreased proportionally. The Third Circuit recognized this 
in its opinion sustaining the district court’s compulsion of the evidence in 
Reynolds: 
 
The present cases themselves indicate the breadth of the claim of 
immunity from disclosure which one government department head has 
already made. It is but a small step to assert a privilege against any 
disclosure of records merely because they might prove embarrassing to 
government officers. Indeed it requires no great flight of imagination to 
realize that if the Government’s contentions in these cases were 
affirmed the privilege against disclosure might gradually be enlarged 
by executive determinations until, as is the case in some nations today, 
it embraced the whole range of governmental activities. 
We need to recall in this connection the words of Edward Livingston: 
“No nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too close an 
inspection into the conduct of its officers, but many have been brought 
to ruin, and reduced to slavery, by suffering gradual imposition and 
abuses, which were imperceptible, only because the means of publicity 
had not been secured.” And it was Patrick Henry who said that “to 
cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an 
abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man and every friend to his 
country.”163
 
True to the Third Circuit’s misgivings, the executive branch’s notions of 
what falls under the national security label have steadily expanded since 
World War II. During the 1950s, the era of Reynolds, the executive 
departments’ classification system grew exponentially. Although 
spawned by legitimate needs, it soon grew into “an extravagant and 
indefensible system of denial.”164 The executive alone monitored its 
uncontrolled descent into official secrecy, and “[b]ecause the secrecy 
system was controlled by those on whom it bestowed prestige and 
 162. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 163. Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 164. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 341. 
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protection, it had long since overridden its legitimate objectives.”165 By 
1972, there were 20 million classified documents, of which “less than 
one-half of 1 percent . . . actually contain[ed] information qualifying 
even for the lowest defense classification . . . .”166 This culture of secrecy 
bred ridiculous and disturbing offspring. Zagel reported that: 
The executive has refused . . . to disclose (a) the number and use of 
administrative aircraft to a member of Congress; (b) the picture of the 
interior of a plush transport plane to a member of Congress; (c) 
information on monkey research to the press . . . ; (d) photographs of the 
B-58 and the Titan missile to the press even though both were in public 
view; (e) a report on a bow and arrow weapon developed during World 
War II to the scientist who developed the weapon . . . ; (f) a report on 
pollution of ground supply water adjoining an arsenal . . . to a member of 
Congress; [and] (g) reports dating back to 1907 of attacks by sharks on 
seamen to a group of scientists.167
According to Schlesinger, “when one member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff wrote another saying that too many undeserving papers were being 
stamped Top Secret, his note itself was stamped Top Secret.”168
Gardner observed the implications of over-classification on the state 
secrets privilege: 
 
One frequent criticism of the Reynolds standard is that the government 
can protect almost any type of information from discovery with an 
assertion of the state secret privilege. Current standards do not require 
that information be classified as secret; nor do the standards require that 
the information not be in the public domain. Knowledge regarding 
nearly any aspect of our country is valuable to an enemy. Obviously, 
information such as the location of missile silos, training methodology 
for special forces, satellite locations, and weapon designs would assist 
an enemy and should receive protection from public disclosure. 
However, information such as the distance between Charlotte and 
Washington, the dates and locations of Air Force shows, the locations 
of banks, the type of food the President enjoys also would be useful 
information to an enemy and could “potentially prejudice” the nation’s 
security.169
 
Although his comparison may seem absurd, stranger protections have 
 165. Id. at 344. 
 166. Id. (quoting testimony of a former Pentagon security officer). 
 167. Zagel, supra note 7, at 898. 
 168. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 344. 
 169. Gardner, supra note 8, at 585–86 (internal citations omitted). 
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occurred. To be sure, the D.C. Circuit ratified such behavior by the 
executive when it upheld the NSA’s claim of privilege for information 
that already had been “let out of the bag.”170
The problem with excessive secrecy goes deeper than its silliness or 
even its costs. It lies in the fact that “almost any information can qualify 
as privileged”171 because of the expansive scope of the information that 
arguably could pose a reasonable danger to the national security. It need 
not actually present a security risk, but must bear merely the potentiality 
of risk. This minimal standard, which does not provide a method for 
distinguishing information that truly merits protection from information 
that is trivial or that demonstrates wrongdoing or incompetence, 
transforms the executive’s claim of privilege into a practically 
irrebuttable presumption of privilege. This standard “renders review of 
such claims perfunctory.”172
Why take secrecy to such an extreme level? The presidential 
historian Arthur Schlesinger saw three advantages accruing to the 
executive: the power to withhold, the power to leak, and the power to 
lie.173 By withholding “knowledge that would make possible an 
independent judgment on executive policy” the executive can “defend 
[its] national security monopoly and prevent democratic control of 
foreign policy.”174
The power to leak allows the executive “to tell the people what it 
serve[s] the government’s purpose that they should know.”175 This 
principle was amply demonstrated in the current Bush administration’s 
arguments for the war in Iraq. Its convenient selection of questionable 
evidence that supported its claims and retention of more reliable 
evidence that contradicted them is the archetype of this power to leak. 
The executive’s hypocrisy on the protection of national security 
information is the great elephant in the courtroom during state secrets 
cases. The Carter administration leaked information about the secret 
Stealth bomber reportedly to rebut political opponents who claimed that 
the nation’s defenses had deteriorated during his presidency,176 and then 
claimed secrecy was essential to protect the Vietnam-era domestic 
spying in the Halkin cases. The current Bush administration leaked the 
identity of an undercover CIA agent reportedly to punish her husband, a 
 170. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.b and supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 171. Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 579. 
 172. Id. 
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diplomat who published an essay refuting the administration’s 
allegations about Iraqi weaponry.177 One may assert, almost without any 
doubt, that if such information had been the subject of a plaintiff’s 
discovery, the state secrets privilege would have been invoked 
successfully and the information would have remained secret. This 
shows that the executive will use secrecy arbitrarily and inconsistently to 
serve its own purposes. Indeed, without any objective and external 
standard to act as a check, there is nothing to stop it from so doing. 
The third advantage is the power to lie. Uncontrolled secrecy allows 
the executive to falsify and dissemble whenever doing so is easier and 
more expedient than taking responsibility or conforming to the rule of 
law. It also “instill[s] in the executive branch the idea that foreign policy 
[and, I would add, national security] [are] no one’s business save its 
own . . . .”178 The diplomatic and military establishments then become 
free to engage in the business of securing their own interests regardless 
of the consequences to the public. 
These advantages gained from secrecy can be seen in the state 
secrets context. Returning to the Halkin and ACLU cases, if we assume 
that the NSA surveillance was illegal for the sake of argument, the 
secrecy and the deferential standards applied to the state secrets privilege 
would provide a safe harbor from prosecution and liability for 
wrongdoing. What is worse, they would encourage further wrongdoing 
because of the practical immunity from responsibility afforded by the 
privilege. 
The Constitution, though ironically conceived in secrecy itself, 
created a government that would rely on a well-informed public for 
support. Extensive, routine, institutionalized secrecy that gives the 
government undue control over public information is not compatible 
with that requirement for good government. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The War Against Terrorism presents special needs for secrecy and 
special problems with its use. The executive branch during the War 
Against Terrorism has strong incentives, as in the Cold War, to withhold 
information. Some incentives are legitimate, but some stem from the 
desire to operate in areas of doubtful constitutionality and legality with 
impunity and without oversight. The tendency in times of fear is to 
accept legal measures that are immediately expedient. But, 
 177. See, e.g., CNN, Bush Acknowledges Declassifying Intelligence, Apr. 11, 2006, 
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 178. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 356. 
  
231] THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 265 
 
paradoxically, the present security crisis introduces an ideal opportunity 
to reassess the state secrets privilege, to recalibrate the application of 
Reynolds to claims of privilege. Many viable alternatives have been 
suggested.179 Furthermore, contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s dicta in Halkin 
II,180 the Reynolds decision is not a constitutional mandate, but is based 
in evidentiary and procedural principles.181 Neither is it founded in the 
federal statutes. Therefore it is open to change by the courts, and change 
is certainly needed. The courts or Congress should strike a balance that 
gives more weight to disclosure of public information, and that denies 
government secrecy as the rule. The Duncan-Halkin formulation should 
be rejected and the state secrets privilege should not obtain until it has 
been shown that a dire, substantial, and actual threat to national security 
will arise from disclosure. 
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